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Preface
Peer Group Situations and Games with Interval Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–8
Rodica M. Branzei, Lina Mallozzi and Stef H. Tijs
Abstract
We consider uncertainty in payoffs in peer group situations. By using the co-
operative interval games approach, we introduce interval peer group situations and
for the related interval peer group games we give properties of monotonicity, con-
vexity and specify the Shapley value and the Weber set. Applications to sequential
production situations and auctions are studied.
Wardrop Equilibria and Price of Anarchy in Multipath Routing Games with
Elastic Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9–19
Julia V. Chuiko, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Tatiana O. Polishchuk and Andrei V. Gurtov
Abstract
We consider equilibrium in multiuser multipath routing optimization problem
in Wardrop model where selfish players distribute their TCP traffic in the shared
multipath network. Minimization of the end-to-end traffic delay over all paths for
each user is the criterion of optimality. We discover that in the game with latency
function fe(δ) = 1−e−αeδ approximating the TCP congestion control over the paths,
the price of anarchy is bounded, leading to the conclusion that non-cooperative
selfish users can safely coexist in the multipath network and successfully achieve a
good performance if each adheres to the equilibrium flow splitting strategy.
The Concept of a Suitable Insurance Policy
Using Leader-Follower Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21–35
Ilaria Colivicchi, Fausto Mignanego and Sabrina Mulinacci
Abstract
Life insurance companies are more and more interested in creating flexible poli-
cies in order to reach more specific segments of the market than in the past. They
can induce the agents to sell a personalized policy to a specific class of clients select-
ing for them an appropriate reward; in this case we have an optimization problem
connected to the reward of the agent. In this paper, the Leader-Follower game is
proposed as a model to study the hierarchical relationship between the company
and the agent and it is applied to a particular case of unit-linked policy.
A Search Resource Allocation Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37–45
Robbert Fokkink and Andrey Yu. Garnaev
Abstract
In this paper we investigate a search resource allocation game with incomplete
information. The Baeysian equilibrium is found in closed form and its uniqueness
is proved. Some properties of equilibrium as function on total search resources are
exploded.
Product Quality Choice on the Game-Theoretical Model Basis . . . . . . . . . . 47–68
Margarita A. Gladkova
Abstract
The problem of quantitative estimation of quality and the development of qual-
ity choice mechanism in case of competition are considered. Quality choice is an
action that is based on changing of quantitative quality estimation. The main theo-
retical goal of the research is to develop a quality choice mechanism which is based
on construction and solution of the appropriate game-theoretical model of competi-
tion taking into account the information on consumers preferences. The suggested
mechanism of quality choice under competition and vertical differentiation can be
used for suggestion some strategic recommendations to companies to plan an effec-
tive production system which is demanded on the market. The paper also presents
the results of empirical research which is an example of application of the suggested
game-theoretical model of competition and vertical differentiation for the market of
Internet-trading systems, which are used for exchange auction.
Effectivity Functions and Bargaining Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69–92
Hans Keiding and Dawidson Razafimahatolotra
Abstract
Effectivity functions are formalized descriptions of the power structure in a so-
ciety; it assigns to each coalition of individuals a family of subsets of the set of
all outcomes in society. These sets may be interpreted as restrictions on society’s
choice of outcome caused by the joint activities of the coalition. The concept of an
effectivity function has found several applications in game theory and social choice.
In the present work, we give a brief introduction to effectivity functions and
their use, and we outline the classical results on core stability. After this, we discuss
another solution concept, the bargaining set introduced by Aumann and Maschler,
in the context of effectivity functions, presenting different ways of generalizing the
notions of objection and counterobjection to this context.
An effectivity function is bargaining set stable if the bargaining set is nonempty
for every assignment of preferences over outcomes to individuals. It turns out that
bargaining set stability, which is a property related to than core stability, cannot
be fully characterized by the standard tools of stability analysis. As a consequence,
we shift attention to a slightly weaker form of stability, where a characterization is
possible in terms of cyclical properties of the effectivity function.
On Shift-invariant Solutions for TU-Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93–103
Kensaku Kikuta
Abstract
We define a subset of the reasonable set by using shifted games and then char-
acterize it. We examine whether various solutions are included in this subset or
not.
The Game-Theoretic Emission Reduction Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105–123
Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaya
Abstract
A game-theoretic emission reduction model is studied. The process is modeled
as cooperative differential game. The stable mechanism of distribution of the com-
mon cooperative costs among players is proposed. The perfect Nash equilibrium is
found. We design a stable Shapley value as a cooperative solution, which is time-
consistent. The Shapley value is also strategic stable and satisfies the irrational-
behavior-proofness condition. The coalitional solution in the form of PMS-vektor is
constructed.
Optimality Principles in the Categories of Non-Strategic Non-Cooperative
Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125–137
Victor E. Lapitsky
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to develop a consistent theory of formal schemes
of solution concepts for non-cooperative games using some universal properties of
equilibrium. It is well known that despite of empirical analysis of numerous different
ideas of optimality, for a moment there is no general theory or even definition
of the ”formal side” of corresponding solution concepts. We propose a general
axiomatic definition of formal scheme of solution concept for the most general class
of non-cooperative games using a natural categorial structure on it. To be more
accurate, we introduce a categorial structure on this class of games and then, using
as conceptual justification the fact that naturally generalized equilibrium is a functor
from this category, formally define an optimality principle as a suitable functor from
this category of games to the category of sets. Further we introduce in this way a
number of equilibrium-like optimality principles and study some of their properties
and relations.
Blackwell Prediction for Categorical Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139-151
Hans Rudolf Lerche
Abstract
We study the problem of sequential prediction of categorical data and discuss
a generalisation of Blackwell’s algorithm on 0-1 data. The arguments are based on
Blackwell’s approachability results given in Blackwell, D. (1956). They use mainly
linear algebra.
Partial Cooperative Equilibrium Models and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153-163
Lina Mallozzi and Stef H. Tijs
Abstract
We deal with n-person normal form game where a subset of players decide to
cooperate (signatories) and choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare
of the coalition members. The non-cooperating (non-signatories) players choose
their strategies as a Nash equilibrium. In this paper the Stackelberg assumption
is considered for the partial cooperative equilibrium concept and the model is pre-
sented also in the case of non-signatories multiple decision. The class of symmetric
aggregative games is considered and applications to public goods games and global
emission games are illustrated.
Strong Berge Equilibrium and Strong Nash Equilibrium: Their Relation and
Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165–179
Rabia Nessah, Moussa Larbani and Tarik Tazda¨ıt
Abstract
This paper investigates the existence of strong Berge equilibrium which is also
Pareto efficient (SBPE) and strong Nash equilibrium in continuous and convex
games. We present the main properties of SBPE and strong Nash equilibrium
(SNE), and we prove that any SBPE is also a SNE. We show that with the com-
pactness of strategy spaces, the concavity of payoff functions and a certain condition,
the existence of SBPE is guaranteed. Finally, we suggest a method for computing
this equilibrium. Our equilibrium existence result neither implies nor is implied by
the existing results in the literature such as in Ichiishi [1981].
On Lie Point Symmetries in Differential Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181–190
Arsen Palestini
Abstract
A technique to determine closed-loop Nash equilibria of n-player differential
games is developed when their dynamic state-control system is composed of decou-
pled ODEs. In particular, the theory of Lie point symmetries is exploited to achieve
first integrals of such systems.
Feedback Solution for Class of Differential Games with
Random Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191–202
Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyas
Abstract
The class of differential games with random duration is studied in the paper.
The problem of the feedback Nash equlibrium calculation is examined. As a result,
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the problem with random duration is
derived. The results are illustrated with an example.
A Notational Note on Agreeable Solutions in Differential Games . . . . . 203–206
David W. K. Yeung and Leon A. Petrosyan
Abstract
A comprehensive characterization of time-consistent agreeable solution in dif-
ferential games has been provided by Petrosyan (1997). This article presents a
notational note to the analysis so that readers acquainted with value functions in
control and optimization would find it more familiar.
Product A Strong Equilibria Technique in Differential Games . . . . . . . . 207–223
Nikolay A. Zenkevich and Andrey V. Zyatchin
Abstract
In this paper three conceptions of strong equilibrium are investigated. It is shown
that two of them are subsets of one, which is more general. The dependence between
definitions is shown on a finite game of two players. These definitions and their
properties are specially investigated in differential games. A special technique based
on a scalarization of vector criteria is used to construct strong equilibrium. The main
results of the paper are sufficient conditions for strong equilibrium existence. This
approach is implemented in an example of differential game with three players.
